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PARODY PROTECTION UNDER THE
FAIR USE DOCTRINE-THE EVEREADY
STANDARD: IT KEEPS GOING, AND
GOING, AND GOING ...
The federal government promulgated the first copyright stat-
ute in 1790,1 and since that time, the law in this area has had a
turbulent and confusing history.2 Federal statutes3 enacted pursu-
ant to the Copyright Clause in article 1, section 8 of the United
States Constitution aim to promote science and the useful arts4 by
affording a limited monopoly to the author of a copyrighted work.5
The fair use doctrine is one limitation on the exclusive control an
I See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Passed by the First Congress and entitled "An
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books
to the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies, during the Times Therein Mentioned," this
statute gave an author "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending" his work for a period of fourteen years. Id.
2 See Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copy-
right, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615, 616 (1979). The first copyright statute was amended many
times, and complete revisions of the law occurred in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5659-60
(House report accompanying 1976 revisions to Copyright laws). These revisions were neces-
sitated by significant technical advances in the methods of the reproduction and dissemina-
tion of ideas, which jeopardized the rights of the original author in his copyrighted work. Id.
"The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with freedom of
expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemina-
tion, on the other." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 n.12
(1984) (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT foreword, at vii-viii
(1967)).
' See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-106 (West 1977 & Pamph. 1993). These sections enumerate
the copyright owner's rights, id., which are subject to certain limitations detailed in subse-
quent Code sections. See id. §§ 107-120 (West 1977 & Pamph 1993).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause empowers Congress "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
I See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. Not only is a copyright owner's monopoly power limited,
but it is not primarily designed to provide him with a benefit. Id. Although the copyright
owner's limited monopoly provides him with an economic incentive to create, as he is as-
sured a fair monetary return for his labor, its main goal is to. assure that the public will have
access to his creation after the limited time of exclusive control has expired. Id.; Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring monopoly lie in the gen-
eral benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
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author has over her copyrighted work6 and entitles a copier to an
"allowable" infringement of the copyright in furtherance of the as-
sumed public good that will result from such a taking.
7
The fair use doctrine is commonly invoked in the defense of a
parody, which is defined as a "writing in which the language and
style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in
ridicule often with certain peculiarities greatly heightened or exag-
gerated." 8 Due to the nature of a parody, an obvious tension
emerges between the rights of the original author and the parodist.
Courts have attempted to alleviate this tension, but have been no-
tably unsuccessful and inconsistent.9 Early conflicts in this area
were most often resolved in favor of the author in decisions that
maintained that usage of the original work could only be mini-
' See 17 US.C.A. § 107. Fair use allqws one to utilize another's copyrighted work for
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research." Id. The idea of
fair use first appeared in Folsom v. Marsh, in which Justice Story observed that "copyrights
approach nearer than any other class of cases... to what may be called the metaphysics of
the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be very subtitle [sic] and refined, and
sometimes, almost evanescent." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
The precise term "fair use," however, did not appear until nearly thirty years later. See
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
1 See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d
57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). The doctrine of fair use "permits courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster." Id.
8 WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1986). The term "parody" is
used broadly in this article to encompass a literary imitation of a written work, a song whose
words mock another's verse, or a television skit that mimics a motion picture. Technically,
some of the works herein mentioned may be more precisely classified as either travesty or
burlesque. A travesty places characters from serious works in ridiculous situations and de-
rives its comic effect from this ludicrousness. See Light, supra note 2, at 616 n.6. Burlesque
imitates the actual style of the original author by applying that style to a new subject in a
humorous way. Id. Regardless, all three types utilize an original work to produce their own
derivation. Id.
' Compare Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 448 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (holding parody of commercial advertisement fair use), and Miller Brewing Co. v.
Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (although commercials
were similar, still fair use), with Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1202, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (parody advertisement held to diminish value of original there-
fore not fair use), and MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding parody
of song merely substituting dirty lyrics fulfilled demand for original and was thus not fair
use). See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National. Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980)
(taking was not substantial, even though lyrics were distasteful, still fair use); Benny v.
Loew's, Inc. 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam sub nom, Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (burlesqued television version of movie
unfair use); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding burlesque television version fair use).
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mal.10 Prompted by criticism from commentators and dissenting
justices who advocated the importance of parody as a literary
genre,1" courts began to embrace parody and expanded the fair use
standard to allow parodists greater freedom of appropriation. 2
The continual liberalization of this standard culminated in the re-
cent district court case of Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 13 in which the court held that the creation of the "best" par-
ody was a fair use. 4
This Note will demonstrate that through the inconsistent ap-
plication of the statutory fair use factors, courts have continually
muddied the morass of law encompassing fair use parody. Further,
it will note that the Eveready court has only added to this uncer-
tainty and placed the law in a state clearly antithetical not only to
established case law, but to the policies underlying the Copyright
Act itself. Parts One and Two will review the history and purpose
behind the fair use factors, and detail their inconsistent applica-
tion and interpretation to demonstrate their ineffectiveness in gov-
erning fair use parodies today. Part Three will propose the strict
adherence to a refined definition of parody and advocate a judicial
refocusing upon the fourth and most relevant factor to modern fair
use parodies-the economic impact of the parody on the market of
10 See Benny, 239 F.2d at 536; Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914) (parody can not take important and striking direct quotes); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287,
288 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909). The Benny court stated that under the fair use doctrine "a writer
may be guided" by the copyrighted works of another in supporting his own text, but did not
say to what extent the guidance became unfair exploitation. See Benny, 239 F.2d at 536.
11 See Robert J. Kapelke, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 550,
556 (1966) (quantitative fair use test is unrealistic restraint on parodists); Comment, Parody
of Copyrighted Works: Death of an Art Form?, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 49, 65 (1957) ("To limit
burlesque to only a few incidents of the original and to deny its right to take details and
sequence of events is indeed an artificial standard."); see also Wilson, 677 F.2d at 191
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (parody "is the price an artist pays for success").
12 See 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NiM ER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[D] (1992);
see also Elsmere, 623 F.2d at 253 (court recognized entertainment value of parody in mod-
em "solemn" world), Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545, (parody has "thrived from time of Chaucer to.
. .Allen Sherman"); see also Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 354 (author entitled to
more extensive use of copyrighted work in creating parody than other fictional works). But
see Benny, 239 F.2d at 537 (parody would not be given special treatment). The Benny court
felt that "[o]therwise, any individual or corporation could appropriate, in its entirety, a seri-
ous and famous dramatic work, protected by copyright, merely by introducing comic devices
[into it]." Id. at 537.
13 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. IlM. 1991).
14 See id. Despite the overwhelming similarities between the two television commercials
involved in the case, the court held that the Coors commercial constituted a fair use and
therefore was not an infringement on Eveready's copyright. Id.,
1993] 1171
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1169
the original work. Finally, Part Four will detail the numerous pol-
icy concerns surrounding fair use parodies, and note their optimal
satisfaction under the economic impact standard.
I. FAIR USE GENERALLY
The fair use defense "is the most troublesome [issue] in the
whole law of copyright." 5 The fair use of a work is best defined as
the "privilege in [those] other[] than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his
consent.'6 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the strict en-
forcement of the copyright owner's virtual monopoly power over
her work, for this would inhibit the progression of ideas.17 The par-
adigmatic illustration is the scholar who must refer to and quote
the work of prior scholars to preface her own research. 8 In light of
the value to society of such use of another's work,"9 courts have
attempted to balance the rights of the parodist with those of the
original author.20 In compromising the rights of both parties, the
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
1 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966)(quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY, 260 (1944)), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); see Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682, 684 (S.D. Iowa 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, although the second
work may technically be considered an infringement upon the copyright, if the distribution
of the materials will better serve the public in the free dissemination of information, the use
will be allowed. See Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307.
1" See Zecharia Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 511 (1945). "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our prede-
cessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant him-
self.'" Id.
1" See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (scholar's own work can depend
on ability to refer to and quote prior scholars).
19 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (monop-
oly created by copyright rewards individual author in order to benefit public), Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1630 (1982) (fair use permits second author to use
first author's work for public good).
20 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106. This section is entitled "Exclusive rights in copyrighted
works," and provides in relevant part:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale. .
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
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law guarantees the sovereignty of the original creation while simul-
taneously encouraging its use to proffer new ones." Although the
courts have enumerated common law factors to be considered
when determining the fairness of a particular use,22 the absence of
a clear and definitive test has resulted in inconsistent application
of the fair use doctrine.23
In 1976, in an attempt to delineate a clear standard, Congress
codified the fair use doctrine in section 107 of title 17 of the
United States Code.24 Congress's stated intent was to create a
framework upon which courts could base their decisions, however,
section 107 provided little guidance for the courts because its
stated purpose was to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair
use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in anyway.' ' 25 The doctrine
itself was defined as an equitable one, to be reasonably applied on
an ad hoc basis.2 8 The four relevant factors27 to be considered are:
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; ....
Id.
21 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This compromise must "take
care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who
have employed their time for the... community, may not be deprived of their just merits,.
..; [and] the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, as set forth in Cary v. Longman, 1 East 358, 361
n.(b), 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b) (K.B. 1785).
22 See, e.g., Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir.) (infringement
found where derivative work was merely colorful variation of prior work on same subject),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962); West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833,
838 (2d Cir. 1910) ("extensive copying or paraphrasing of the language" not fair use). See
generally Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYM-
PosiuMa 53-69 (1955) (an in-depth history of fair use factors utilized by courts).
22 See Melanie A. Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHio ST.
L.J. 3, 5 n.26 (1985); supra note 9 and accompanying text. Part of the inconsistency stems
from the nature of the fair use doctrine itself. See Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744
F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984) (fair use is mixture of law and fact), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1004 (1985); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) ("test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague").
24 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
25 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
"Congress made [it] clear that it in no way intended to depart from Court-created principles
or to short-circuit further judicial development." Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Rid-
der Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980).
26 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680
("[b]eyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis"); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (deter-
mination of whether use is fair requires examination of circumstances in each case), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); NIMMER & NiMriR, supra note 12, § 13-05[A] (statute does
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or the
value of the copyrighted work.2
8
II. FAIR USE FACTORS
A. Purpose and Character of the Work
The initial fair use factor to be considered under section 107 is
the purpose and character of the infringing work. 9 Although the
fair uses traditionally allowed by courts were for literary criticism,
and scientific and scholarly purposes,30 the legislature specifically
not provide rule to determine if use is fair).
21 Congress also noted that this framework did not necessarily preclude consideration
of other factors. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 65, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679. The codification of the fair use doctrine actually entailed the reduc-
tion of the common law factors into the four enumerated criteria, although "there [was] no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute." Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5680. These "criteria specified in § 107 follow the words 'shall include,' [and t]he term 'in-
cluding' is defined in § 101 as 'illustrative and not limitative.'" Triangle, 626 F.2d at 1175,
n.10; New Era Publications, Int'l., ApS. v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir.
1989) ("The Copyright Act... lists four non-exclusive factors-I emphasize non-exclusive..
• ."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
The court in the DC Comics case embraced this notion of non-exclusiveness and created
a fifth factor to be considered, the good faith of the parodist in appropriating the work. DC
Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
28 17 U.S.C.A. § 107. The statute is entitled "Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use,"
and the paragraph preceding the four enumerated elements reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 .... the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use [four factors
are to be considered].
Id. The courts are to use these four factors as they wish, emphasizing those which are
most relevant to the case at bar. See Light, supra note 2, at 624.
29 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1).
10 See H.R. REP. No. 476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679-
80. The purposes include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship [and] research." Id.; NIMMER & NIMmER, supra note
12, §§ 13-91 to -92.
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noted that a parody could constitute a fair use.31 Under the "pur-
pose and character of the work" factor a court may consider
whether the "use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit edu-
cational purposes. ' ' 31 Although the Supreme Court has ruled that a
commercial use creates a presumption of unfair copyright exploita-
tion,33 the legislative history of section 107 specifically states that
the commercial character of an activity should be considered in
conjunction with the other enumerated factors.3 4 Despite this clear
instruction, many courts have used the commerciality of a work to
definitively preclude the fair use defense.3 5 Alternatively, other
31 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5678. The
legislature commented that an appropriate consideration for fair use would be the "use in a
parody of some of the content of the work parodied." Id. (emphasis added). Use of the term
"some" has caused much confusion among the courts. See infra notes 45-60 and accompany-
ing text.
A parody however, is not presumed to be a fair use. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,
435 (9th Cir. 1986). Once a work is determined to be a parody, the four factors are consid-
ered to determine whether it constitutes a fair use. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
"2 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
This statement v~as expressly defined as not mandating a "not-for-profit limitation on edu-
cational uses of copyrighted works," but rather was an "express recognition" that the com-
mercial nature of an activity should have some bearing on the fair use issue. Id.; Note,
Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 597 (1956) (commercial and
artistic elements in almost every work create problematic distinction rendering "com-
merciality" pertinent "insofar as determinable"). But see Rosemont Enters. Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (author's commercial motive or lack thereof is
irrelevant to determination of fair use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
" See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
("every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright") (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
The legislative history of § 107 states that "the commercial or non-profit character of an
activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with
other factors in fair use decisions." Id.; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (commercial use alone does not preclude fair use determination). Many courts
have recognized that the commercial nature of a use does not necessarily negate a fair use
determination. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753,
761 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Triangle Publications, nc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 308 (protection extends to
commercial works motivated by commercial gain).
"I See, e.g., D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (commercial use was exploitation for personal profit, not parody); Tin Pan Apple, 737
F. Supp. at 831 (fair use defense failed because defendant's use of copyrighted material to
promote sale of commercial products did not qualify as parody); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034-36 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (fair use
defense rejected when primary purpose behind parody is attempt to make money).
1993] 1175
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courts have adopted a "productive use" test, and noted that unless
the derivative work performs a productive function, it constitutes
copyright infringement. 6 Although the inclusion of this factor was
originally justified by the "long controversy over the.., problems
of fair use ... of copyrighted material for educational and schol-
arly purposes, 3 7 and as such may seem inapplicable to fair use
parodies, the purpose and commercial nature of a parody is espe-
cially relevant to the issue of fair use today.38
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work,39 differentiates between published and unpublished works,
with the latter enjoying a higher level of protection.4 ° This dispa-
rate treatment is justified by an author's unchallenged right to
control the first use of her copyrighted material.41 In considering
3 See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879
(1982); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade,
546 F. Supp. 113, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). These courts utilized the theory that stated "'mere
reproduction of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose' may not be considered fair
use." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13-92 (quoting Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d
at 970) (footnote omitted).
The productive use requirement was argued as inherent in traditionally held fair uses,
which "always had to do with the use by a second author of a first author's work." Id. § 13-
85 (quoting LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978)). If there
was no "use," but merely reproduction of the work for ordinary purposes, infringement
would be found. Id. §§ 13-92, -93. This requirement reflects one purpose of the fair use
doctrine, to foster creativity. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir.
1981) (second author must use work to discover "hitherto" unknown fact); supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the Sony case, acknowledged that the productive use distinction could be helpful
in determining fair use, but stated that it would not be "wholly determinative." See Sony,
464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
37 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
'" See infra notes 89-91, and accompanying text.
39 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2).
"0 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, §§ 13-88.6 to -88.8; Joseph R. Re, The Stage
of Publication as a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 58
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597, 612 (1984). The Supreme Court called a work's unpublished status a
"critical element" of this second factor. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
41 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. Compare Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90, 95-9 (2d Cir.) (court issued injunction against use of unpublished letters in biogra-
phy of J.D. Salinger), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987), with New Era Publications Int'l,
ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir.) (biography of L. Ron Hubbard
utilizing published quotations held fair use), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 297 (1990).
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this factor, courts must determine if the work is "creative, imagi-
native, and original, ... and whether it represent[s] a substantial
investment of time and labor made in anticipation of a financial
return."42 Works that are informational or factual in nature are af-
forded less copyright protection than fictional works, in order to
encourage their rapid dissemination into the realm of public
knowledge.43 Since a work must be published and widely known for
a parodist to create a successful parody, this second factor is, for
the most part, irrelevant in parody cases.44
C. Substantiality of Material Used
The third fair use factor addresses the substantiality of the
taking, or the extent to which the defendant copied the original
work.4 This factor has been the most problematic for the courts.
For instance, the taking of as little as three sentences has been
42 New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1526
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted). Under nature of the work scrutiny, works typically in-
volving "more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness" require less copyright pro-
tection than other original creative works. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface,
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977); see also Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing difficulty in securing copyright protection for historical works).
13 NIMMEt & NIMMER, supra note 12, §§ 13-88.8 to -88.9; see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
563; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984). The distinction between fact and fantasy will vary,
for "even within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the relative proportion of
fact and fancy .... The extent to which one must permit expressive language to be copied,
in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts, will thus vary from case to case."
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563, (quoting Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implica-
tions for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y. 560, 561 (1982)).
4 See Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Elliott M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions, Paradoxes,
Inconsistencies, 61 TEMP. L. RE V. 133, 157-68 (1988). Most courts find at least some artistic
merit in derivative works utilizing the fair use defense, regardless of their purpose. See
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (court rejected notion
advertisements should be denied copyright protection on ground lack artistic merit); see
also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th
Cir. 1980) (fact work was commercial publication neither supports nor hurts fair use claim
under second factor).
The reason for this disregard of the second factor stems primarily from the fact that the
work need not be new, but merely "original." Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429
F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970). To be an original idea, "[n]o large measure of novelty is
necessary .... All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation," no matter how poor
that variation is. Alfred Bell Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1951).
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3).
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held an infringement, 6 while the reproduction of an entire work
has been ruled fair.47
Many courts have focused their analyses on this third fair use
factor in evaluating parodies,48 yet the propriety of this focus is
questionable at best.49 A successful parody necessarily invokes rec-
'0 See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D.
Pa. 1938). But see Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992). In the
Acuff-Rose case, copyright holders of the song "Oh Pretty Woman" brought suit against the
rap group known as 2 Live Crew for its song entitled "Pretty Woman." Id. at 1431. After
determining that 2 Live Crew's song was in fact a parody, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
first three fair use factors weighed against a finding of fair use, and the fourth one was "at
best, neutral." Id. at 1439. The court, focusing on the first factor alone, held that the fact
that the rappers were selling the parody made it an unfair use. Id. "It is likely, for example,
that an identical use of the copyright work in this case at a private gathering on a not-for-
profit basis would be a fair use." Id.
'7 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1361-63, (Ct. C1. 1973), aff'd, 420
U.S. 376 (1975). Courts have continually differed on whether the appropriation of an entire
work can be fair use. Compare Williams, 487 F.2d at 1353 (court renounced idea that entire
copyrighted work could never be copied as "overbroad generalization, unsupported by the
decisions and rejected by years of accepted practice"), with Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) (extensive verbatim copying or paraphras-
ing not fair use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), and Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91
F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937) (no authority supports proposition "wholesale copying" of
"copyrighted material can ever be fair use").
A purely quantitative approach is not acceptable in considering the substantiality of the
material used. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 222 (D.N.J. 1977); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F.
Supp. 348, 353 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Rather, the quantity of borrowed material must be weighed
against the quality of the appropriation. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, §§ 13-88.10
- 13-88.11. Copyright infringement may be found where only a small portion of the work is
copied if the part usurped is material. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1985). The quantum of material used must be interrelated with other
factors such as the quality of the material used and the need of the defendant to use the
appropriated material in his work. New York Times, 434 F. Supp. at 222. The quality of
material used can be determined by the character of the original work and the relative value
of the material taken. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp. 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th
Cir. 1947).
48 See Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
1981); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979); DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
19 See Abramson, supra note 44, at 157. The doctrine of fair use assumes a substantial
taking, as the defense will only be involved when a court has found an infringement, which
occurs when there has been a substantial use. Id.; see, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.,
181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950) (substantial use of copyrighted work is infringement).
Thus, by utilizing this factor, the substantiality of the taking is, in essence, considered twice
in the consideration of fair use, first when determining if there has in fact been an infringe-
ment and second when determining if the infringement could be considered a fair use. Ab-
ramson, supra note 44, at 157. Yet the degree of substantiality can not be said to stand for
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ognition of the work being parodied;50 therefore, it is submitted
that by labeling a particular use as parody, it is implicit that a
substantial amount of the original has been taken.
The traditional standard used to judge the degree of the tak-
ing was the "conjure up" test.5 1 The "conjure up" test allowed a
parodist to appropriate material from another's work to the extent
that it brought about the recalling or conjuring up of the general
image of the original.2 As such, the parody was permitted to trig-
ger a recognition of the work being parodied in the mind of the
ordinary observer, 53 but was required to have independent devel-
opment and expression apart from the original and in furtherance
of its own creative purpose. 4
The limits of the conjure up test were extended in Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,55 in which the court rec-
ognized that the conjure up standard merely established a minimal
amount of allowable taking, and an "[e]ven more extensive use
would still be fair. ' 56 The court in Fisher v. Dees5 7 continued to
the same thing in both instances, for if it did, every fair use defense would fail as a matter
of law. Id. Clearly, this is not the case. Id.Go See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). The court in Cliff Notes realized that the "keystone of parody is
imitation." Id. It noted that "[a] parody must convey two simultaneous--and contradictory--
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.
To the extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is ... a poor parody." Id.
5 See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
52 Id. at 352; accord Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 757-58; Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
11 See Columbia, 137 F. Supp. at 353. Evidence of copying exists when an ordinary
observer who views the derivation immediately detects the original without any aid. Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933); see also Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (parody minimally creates
"fleeting evocation of an original").
See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 830 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); see also Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545 (court noted "disparities in theme, content and style
between the original" and work parodied when found fair use); Benny v. Loew's, Inc. 239
F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), afi'd per curiam sub nom, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (writer may be guided by earlier work of another, but appro-
priation of another's labor without alteration and individual research, violates copyright).
5 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). The Elsmere court was faced with a Saturday Night Live
parody of the "I Love New York" campaign, entitled "I Love Sodom." Id. at 253.
56 Id. at 253 n.1. The court, in affirming the district court's decision, carefully appended
this footnote to read, "that the concept of 'conjuring up' an original came into the copyright
law not as a limitation on how much of an original may be used, but as a recognition that a
parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original in order to make
its humorous point. A parody is entitled at least to 'conjure up' the original." Id. (citations
omitted); accord Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348,
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expand this test and afforded the parodist the additional freedom
to utilize as much of the original work as was "necessary to accom-
plish [the] parodic purpose."58
Recently, the Eveready court pushed the substantiality test
even further, ruling that the creation of the "best" parody, one
which utilized even the essence of the original to achieve its pa-
rodic effect, was fair use.59 This ruling is clearly inconsistent with
354 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
- 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). The Fisher court decided that a parody of the song
"When Sunny Gets Blue", entitled "When Sunny Sniffs Glue," was a fair use. Id. at 440.
58 Id. at 439; accord Elsmere, 623 F.2d at 253. The Fisher court designated three spe-
cific factors to use in determining whether the taking was excessive: (1) the degree of public
recognition of the original work, (2) the ease of conjuring up the original in the chosen
medium, and (3) the focus of the parody. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439. The court noted that due
to the chosen medium, the parodying of a song would ,be difficult to do without near exact
copying, otherwise an ordinary listener would not be able to associate the parody with the
original. Id. The court stated that in light of the parody's medium, purpose (to poke fun at
the song) and brevity, (the parody utilized only the first six lines of the song's 38 bars of
music), it took no more than needed. Id. at 439. It is submitted that by ruling in this man-
ner, the Ninth Circuit adopted the test employed in the Second Circuit in Elsmere, and
brought the law into a somewhat harmonious state. See Suheil J. Totah, Note, Copyright
Law: In Defense of Parody, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 57, 69-70 (1987) (Elsmere allowed
reasonable copying of work "to achieve the purpose of the parody").
59 See Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 447; Steven P. Durchslag, Courts Split on Parody
Standards, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 23, 32. Steven Durchslag is the director of the intel-
lectual property department at Winston & Strawn in Chicago, which represented the Eve-
ready Company in the district court case. Id. at 23. At trial, Robert Simon, the creator of
"the 'Beer Rabbit' commercial" testified that he had taken more than was necessary to con-
jure up the original commercial and intended to create the "best parody." Brief for Appel-
lant at 11, Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., No. 91-2243, (7th Cir. 1991) (case
settled before appellate hearing).
The Eveready case involved a Coors beer commercial which parodied Eveready Battery
Company's Energizer Bunny. Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 443. Eveready had embarked on an
extensive advertising campaign in 1989 that centered around a small, pink mechanical
bunny wearing sunglasses, beach thongs, and carrying a bass drum with the Energizer logo
on it. Id. at 442. This campaign was launched in response to a battery commercial produced
by Eveready's primary competitor, Duracell. Id. In the Eveready commercials, the Energizer
Bunny strolls onto the television screen while a voice states "[s]till going. Nothing outlasts
the Energizer. They keep going and going and going ... [voice fades out]." Id. The Ener-
gizer Bunny advertisements became extremely successful by utilizing a "commercial within
a commercial" format, in which the Bunny would interrupt another fictitious commercial
due to the long lasting power of its batteries. Id. Eveready copyrighted two of the interrup-
tive format commercials, and registered the Energizer Bunny as its trademark. Eveready,
765 F. Supp. at 443.
The Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") decided to "parody" the Energizer Bunny and
created a commercial featuring a well known actor, Leslie Nielson. Id. Mr. Nielson was
dressed to emulate the Energizer Bunny, wearing a dark business suit, white rabbit ears,
white tail and rectangular pink rabbit feet. Acting as the Bunny did, Nielsen beat on a life-
sized bass drum with the Coors Light logo on it while interrupting a fictitious beer commer-
cial. Id. There was even a voice at the end of the commercial stating "Coors Light... keeps
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established precedent, which required a court to balance the paro-
dist's right to create the "best" parody with the original author's
right to protect her copyrighted expressions.60
D. Effect of Appropriation on Potential Market for Original
Work
The fourth statutory fair use factor involves evaluating the ef-
fect of the use uponthe potential market for the original work.61
Although it has been recognized that an appropriating work may
increase the demand for the copyrighted work,62 a contrary argu-
ment posits that a parody diminishes the demand for the original
and therefore reduces its economic value. 3 The economic effect of
the parody on the original work has been "widely accepted to be
the most important" factor,64 yet the standards applied to deter-
mine this effect have varied.6 5 A recent trend in the judiciary dem-
growing and growing and growing... [voice fades out]." Id.
Although Eveready enumerated a plethora of similarities between its commercial and
the Coors "parody," including elements that were the essence of the Energizer Bunny's suc-
cess, the court "found it unnecessary to engage in a 'substantial similarity' analysis." Id. at
445-46. Rather, the court, almost arbitrarily, stated that the Coors advertisement utilized
elements from the Eveready commercial that were far from excessive. Id. at 447-48.
60 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979). Such a balance is necessary to protect the original expressions of the copy-
right owner. Id. Although the Walt Disney court recognized that in certain situations there
might be a "special need for accuracy," the court concluded that given the widespread rec-
ognition of the Disney characters, not much taking was needed to evoke their image in the
minds of the public. Id. at 757-58. Applying the standard used in the Walt Disney case to
the Eveready case, it is submitted that the high degree of public recognition surrounding
the successful Energizer Bunny commercials would similarly necessitate minimal use of the
original to invoke it in the minds of viewers. See Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 443 (Energizer
Bunny ads were among most popular in country and deemed "break through" in the indus-
try); Durchslag, supra note 59, at 32; see also Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215
U.S.P.Q. 124, 132 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (in our media-saturated society, recognition of television
jingle is widespread, thus extent to which parody must borrow to conjure up original is
minimal).
61 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4).
62 See Kapelke, supra note 11, at 567 (discussing rise in demand for original because
imitation peaks public's curiosity and serves as advertisement for copyrighted work).
'3 See Durchslag, supra note 59, at 32-33 (parody reduced economic value as unique-
ness of original commercial was diminished by similar ads).
" See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (single
most important fair use element is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work"); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 450-51 (1984) (effect of appropriation upon potential market is important consideration
directed by Congress); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980).
6" See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118
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onstrates a focus on the function of the appropriated use and
whether it serves to displace or usurp the original in its market,
rather than on the potential reduction in value of the copyrighted
work."6
In applying this "displacement" approach, the Eveready court
concluded that a Coors commercial, which parodied Eveready's
"Energizer Bunny" commercials, 67 would not adversely affect Eve-
ready's potential Energizer Bunny market.6 8 The court noted that
consumers would not stop watching the Energizer Bunny on one
channel in order to view the Coors advertisement on another.6 9
This narrow interpretation of the economic impact factor, however,
fails to account for the losses Eveready will experience due to this
blatant copying of its previously unprecedented television commer-
cial format.70
In recent decades, innovative advertising campaigns have
amassed huge royalties for their sponsors. 1 Creative formats and
subjects are aggressively sought after as consumers frequently re-
call that "catchy" tune or unique commercial when deciding which
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (if derivative product satisfies demand and becomes potential competitor,
or results in "detrimental associations" with plaintiff's property, not fair use); Pillsbury, 215
U.S.P.Q. at 130 (plaintiff must demonstrate depreciation in value of copyrighted work re-
sulting from unauthorized appropriation).
" See Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 448 (quoting Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437-38 and Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)). The standard to be ap-
plied when evaluating this factor in relation to parody is "not its potential to destroy or
diminish the market for the original ... but rather whether it fulfills the demand for the
original .... Thus, infringement occurs when a parody supplants the original in markets the
original is aimed at, or in which the original is or has reasonable potential to become, com-
mercially valuable." Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 448; see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992) (accepting district court's conclu-
sion that Nintendo failed to show harm to present market).
11 See supra note 59.
68 See Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 448 (court found no indication "fair use" of commer-
cial would supplant its market demand).
19 Id. The court noted that since the parody did not usurp or supplant the market for
the Eveready commercial, the effect of the use upon the potential market was irrelevant to
the fair use analysis. Id.
70 See Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 n.13 (N.D.
Tex. 1981). "In advertising, the appropriation of the form and substance of a copyrighted
work will cause that copyrighted work to lose its valuable uniqueness and originality...."
Id. The Dr. Pepper court noted that "[d]istractions from the uniqueness and originality of
the "Be A Pepper" commercials would logically shorten the life of the campaign which
would be a loss of the business goodwill of Plaintiff." Id. at 1208.
71 See Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 443; Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208. Eveready's ads
have been deemed "break through" ads in the advertising industry. Eveready, 765 F. Supp.
at 443.
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product to purchase.7 2 Accordingly, advertising campaigns can en-
dure for considerable periods of time, continually building up
goodwill for their sponsors.73 To allow either a competitive product
or even an unrelated sponsor to appropriate distinctive elements
from such a campaign will detract from its uniqueness and novelty,
and thereby decrease its commercial life. 4 Once the original adver-
tisement's freshness is destroyed, its ability to sell products will
concomitantly be diminished.75 Therefore, the original author
would experience an economic detriment, which will go unrecog-
nized under the Eveready standard.
III. REFINEMENT OF FAIR USE PARODY
A. Strict Adherence to Exact Definition
Although the value of parody as literary work is a valid con-
cern, the parody defense has been abused by exploiters looking for
a haven under which they may pirate the work of another. 6 An
analysis of the history of parody cases reveals two distinct catego-
ries of "parodies": true parodies that attempt to satirize or com-
72 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1166 (9th Cir. 1977) (popularity of children's television show made characters' images desir-
able to use on other children's goods); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238,
241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Ideal case dealt with the marketing of pre-teen dolls whose
appeal created a distinct impression in the minds of their juvenile audience. Id. at 241-42.
The court noted that the dolls created an image in the minds of the "youngsters who, on the
basis of this impression, [went] to the stores with their parents... after television ha[d]
made its impact on them." Id. at 242.
7' See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 130 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
("the trade character 'Poppin' Fresh' stands for 'a quantum of goodwill of inestimable
value"' for Pillsbury); Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208 (huge success of "Be A Pepper"
campaign gave it estimated life span of ten years).
7' See Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208; Durchslag, supra note 59, at 33. The elements
held to be copyrightable in television commercials include those that are the expressive as-
pects of the audiovisual medium. C. Blore & D. Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674
F. Supp. 671, 676-77 (D. Minn. 1987). Expressive aspects include "particular montage style,
camera angle, framing, hairstyle [of actors/actresses], jewelry, decor, makeup and back-
ground," in essence, the "concept behind" the commercial. Id. at 677.
7 See Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208 n.13; see also Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 446-47
(primary purpose of television commercials is to increase product sales and thereby increase
income); C. Blore, 674 F. Supp. at 677 (commercials attempt to distinguish "images and
sounds from the otherwise infinite universe of commercials" to sell product).
7' See DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (mere "adaptation" of another's work not fair use); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (unfairly excessive copy of song under guise of fair use
parody not allowed).
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ment on the work being parodied, and parodies that merely appro-
priate the recognizable aspects of an original work in order to gain
public recognition and thereby sell unauthorized derivations. 77 The
fair use factors should be applied and utilized to protect only those
parodies that present true critical or comical satire.78 A court
should, as a threshold matter, ascertain whether the infringing use
is a true parody or a parody used for purely commercial purposes.79
While all parodies may be said to have some commercial motive,80
however minor, those with principally commercial goals would not
be allowed to utilize the defense of fair use.8" It is also suggested
that the definition of parody should be clarified to constitute a de-
rivative work, 2 which utilizes the ideas of another but adds inde-
7 Compare Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d
Cir. 1980) (skit poked fun at New York City's public relations advertising campaign), and
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir.) (Mad Magazine published
parody that humprously altered lyrics of twenty-five songs), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964), with MCA, 677 F.2d at 182, 184 (defendant parodied song "fostering" similarities to
original, in order to create needed publicity and without intent to parody), and DC Comics
v. Crazy Eddie, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (unjustifiable appropriation of
copyrighted work existed where defendant's commercial varied from original only by substi-
tuting name of sponsor and business purpose).
11 See Crazy Eddie, 205 U.S.P.Q. at 1178. With respect to works that attempt to capi-
talize on the success of another, the court in Crazy Eddie determined that such copies did
not qualify as parodies, and thus were not fair use, but were "unjustifiable appropriation[s]"
for personal profit. Id.; see Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F.
Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (parody lacking critical comment not fair use); MCA, 677
F.2d at 182, 184. The fair use doctrine should not be utilized when one plagiarizes the work
of another for commercial gain and calls the end result a parody on the mores of society. Id.
79 See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(determination of work as parody required prior to considering fair use factors); Clemmons,
supra note 23, at 11-14 (discussing various definitions of parody). If not determined a par-
ody, the work is not entitled to invoke the fair use defense. Id. at 14; accord Crazy Eddie,
205 U.S.P.Q. at 1178.
so See Note, supra note 32, at 597 ("both commercial and artistic elements are involved
in almost every [work]"); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (parodies distributed commercially may be "more in the nature of an edito-
rial or social commentary than . . . an attempt to capitalize financially on the plaintiff's
original work").
81 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). In
the Harper &.Row case, the defendants attempted to reprint copyrighted material that had
been licensed to another magazine. Id. at 543. The Court noted that appropriations may
have incidental commercial purposes, but if the primary purpose of the defendant was to
supplant the commercial success of the first work, a finding of fair use would be erroneous.
Id. at 562; see Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974) (primary purpose of work was to compete
with original so not fair use).:
82 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. This section defines a derivative work as being "based upon one or
more preexisting works." Id.
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pendent and distinct creative input, and functions as a comical or
critical commentary whose commercial gain is merely incidental.
This definition is consistent with the basic copyright principle that
it is not the "idea" but rather the "expression" of the idea that is
copyrightable.8 s By adhering to this definition, the law would not
impede subsequent creative endeavors from incorporating prior
ideas. 4 Further, compliance with this definition would ensure the
creation of parodies that are truly comical and critical comments,
for parodies with such purposes would not normally be licensed by
authors of serious works.8 5 Finally, and most importantly, such a
definition unequivocally omits works such as the Eveready "par-
ody," which lack creative substance and merely latch onto the suc-
cess of another's work in order to achieve purely commercial
ends."
The definition of parody suggested in this section, through its
8 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). The idea-expression dichotomy arose early
in the history of copyright cases and afforded protection only to the expression of an idea.
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931). In the Nichols case, Judge Learned Hand formulated an "abstractions"
test, stating "there is a point in [a] series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended." Id. (emphasis added). Numerous cases
have drawn this distinction. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F.
Supp. 429, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (commercials parodying originals did not encroach on pro-
tected expression); Shipman v. RKO Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1938)
(copyright protects particular expressions of thematic concepts, not general themes or
plots).
Courts have recognized an exception to the idea-expression dichotomy when the idea
and the expression are inseparable. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971). In such an instance, the copying of the expression will not
be barred "since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly
of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner." Id. at 742.
, See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1179 (5th Cir. 1980). The idea-expression dichotomy balances the copyright interest of the
owner with the First Amendment right of the public. Id. The original author's ability to
control his work is limited to accommodate the public's need for "free access to ideas as part
of the democratic dialogue." Id. (citations omitted).
15 See NiMimER & NImmlER, supra note 12, § 13-87. Few authors would give a parodist a
license to mimic their work, as their "'self-esteem' is seldom strong enough." Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, to insure the perpetuation of such works, their
consideration under the fair use doctrine should be mandatory. Id. Thus,."the parody de-
fense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally can
not be bought." Gordon, supra note 19, at 1633 n.177.
" See Wainright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977)
("[Fair use] distinguishes between a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for
personal profit") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Tin Pan Apple, Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 830-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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emphasis on the comical or critical nature of the use and its in-
quiry into the type of work at issue, comports with the first statu-
tory fair use factor-the character and purpose of the use. 7 More-
over, by excluding uses with primarily. commercial purposes from
the definition, this approach is consistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling that a commercial use is presumed to be an unfair
one.
88
B. The Economic Ramifications of a True Parody
Once deemed a true parody under the aforementioned defini-
tion, the work should then be scrutinized under the only other fac-
tor in section 107 that is relevant to parodies-the actual and po-
tential economic ramifications of the parody both to the original
author and to the parodist."' It can generally be stated that an un-
favorable parody will affect the marketability of the original
work.90 The fair use doctrine, however, protects and even encour-
ages criticism.91 The courts, therefore, must be careful to shift
their focus from this legitimate diminution in value to the more
pertinent issue of whether the parody actually fulfills or diminishes
the demand for, or significantly devalues, the original in any way.92
87 See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
88 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
so 17 U.S.C § 107(4); see also Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d
354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (need not copy substantial portion of work to invade copyright, but
where "value of the original is sensibly diminished," infringement will be found) (quoting
West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)).
80 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting KAPLAN, supra note 2,
at 69). Impeding the marketability of an original is allowable, because "through its critical
function, a 'parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it com-
mercially as well as artistically.'" Id.
91 See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (the focus of the economic effect of the parody is not the
"potential to destroy or diminish the market for the original--any bad review can have that
effect"); Wainright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977)
(classic fair use is quoting work to criticize it); Gordon, supra note 19, at 1141 (" 'destruc-
tive' parodies play an important role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protec-
tion even though they may discourage or discredit an original author").
92 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (show
"some meaningful likelihood of future harm"); Elsmere Music Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
In analyzing the effect of the derivative work, courts should not be limited to a consid-
eration of actual present harm or certain future harm. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. Instead, the
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that "some meaningful like-
lihood of future harm exists." Id. This showing could encompass harm to the original work
itself, or harm to any future derivations that the author might produce. New Line Cinema
1186
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With this caveat in mind, courts should not employ a merely sub-
stitutive test, which limits inquiry to usurpation of demand by
products within the same market.13 Such a test will not account for
parodies that impair the market of the original rather than replace
it.94 Instead, a court should look at the value of a copyrighted work
in its entirety, accounting for its goodwill and uniqueness in the
marketplace.9 5 Then, the court should determine if the parody at-
tempts to, or inadvertently does, capitalize upon or diminish this
uniqueness in any way. 6
Some courts have also inquired into the morality of the pur-
ported infringing work in assessing the propriety of a fair use de-
fense. The question of morality, however, should not operate as a
threshold to a valid claim to fair use,97 but merely as another fac-
Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
93 See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 215 (5th ed. 1979) (courts should ascertain if
"use is capable of serving as a substitute for the original"). This standard as applied to
parody is ineffective, however, for as the Elsmere court noted, the functional difference be-
tween a serious work and a satire based upon it will generally prevent a parody from becom-
ing a substitute good for original. Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 745. Thus, by exclusively exam-
ining whether commercial substitution is likely to determine fair use, parodies that impair
but do not replace the market for the original may be allowed. See NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 12, § 13-88 (where work has substantially similar material but different function,
fair use may apply).
Clearly that was the case in Eveready. See Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.,
765 F. Supp. 440, 445-48 (N.D. IlM. 1991). Notwithstanding the extreme similarity of the
Coors parody to the Eveready commercial, which thus undercut the originality of the Ener-
gizer commercial, the court noted that the Coors advertisement did not "usurp or replace"
demand for the original, and thus was a fair use. Id. at 448 (emphasis added). The court
further noted that "to the extent that the Coors commercial may have any effect on the
market for the Energizer Bunny commercials, that effect would not be relevant to the copy-
right fair use analysis." Id. It is submitted that this similarity would have an effect on the
potential market of the original, so its inclusion in fair use consideration should therefore be
mandated.
" See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (singing telegram using comic book character not substitute for original yet
"tarnished image" so not fair use); Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1202, 1204, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (although restaurant was not competitor in soft drink
market, commercial still had detrimental effect on original ad so not fair use).
" See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1171 (9th Cir. 1977). The Krofft court's analysis, noted the goodwill value of the Disney
characters and stated that "[t]he 'idea' of Mickey Mouse is, after all, no more than a mouse.
Yet the particular expression of that mouse has phenomenal commercial value and is recog-
nized worldwide." Id.
" See Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1208 n.13. The court remarked in a footnote that
"[iun advertising, the appropriation of the form and substance of a copyrighted work will
cause that copyrighted work to lose its valuable uniqueness and originality ..... Id.
7 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The
court in Pillsbury declined to consider the salacious content of the parody in assessing its
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tor in the evaluation of a parody.98 Implicit in the economic con-
sideration is whether the parody places the copyright owner's work
in such a "bawdy and disparaging light" that it diminishes its mar-
ketable value.99 The Ninth Circuit effectively summarized this con-
cern when it stated that "[p]arody in its proper role creates some-
thing new by drawing from the old; but when it has the effect of
refashioning or destroying the old, it is not protected."' 100
The concept employed in evaluating a parody's economic det-
riment to an original work can be analogized to the dilution theory
in trademark law.10 Under the dilution theory, the owner of a
trademark possesses an intangible property right that derives its
value principally from its ability to invoke favorable impressions in
the minds of the public. 02 The law recognizes that such favorable
impressions should not be diminished by unauthorized uses of a
trademark, as they may injure or dilute the mark's reputation in
the eyes of the public and thus undercut its commercial value. 0 3
validity under the fair use defense. Id. The Copyright Act has been scrutinized and deter-
mined to protect all creative works, whether obscene or not. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-860 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1980).
98 See DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118 n.1; see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.
v. Pussycat Cinemas, 604 F.2d 200, 202, 206 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979) (although obscene nature of
appropriation was not at issue, court could not overlook its gross and revolting nature).
99 See DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118. When the defendant's parody serves to tarnish
or impede the image the plaintiff has worked diligently to create and perpetuate, then the
use cannot be considered fair. Id. The plaintiff, DC Comics, adhered to a strict policy of
painstakingly selecting suitable licensees for its characters, based upon their apparent abil-
ity to responsibly promote the characters in a commercially useful manner compatible with
the characters images. Id. at 113. Thus, the disdainful appropriation of plaintiff's characters
"Wonder Woman" and "Superman" into "Wonder Wench" and "Dark Dent/Superstud"
was disallowed. Id. at 119.
100 Id. Defendants have the right to discuss or criticize the plaintiff's work, but they
may not alter the plaintiff's property by changing its popular associations. See id. at 118-19.
101 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L.
REV. 813, 818-825 (1927). Although not expressly recognized in the United States Code, ap-
proximately one-half of the states have enacted "anti-dilution" statutes. Robert J. Shaugh-
nessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079,
1087 (1986); see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151 (West 1988) (unauthorized use of trademark
will be prohibited if there exists "likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark .. .of the prior user, notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services").
102 See Shaughnessy, supra note 101, at 1086; see also Schechter, supra note 101, at 818
(function of trademark is to favorably impress consumers to stimulate further purchases).
"I Schechter, supra note 101, at 825. Similarly, a parody will not be deemed a fair use
if it tends to confuse the public into thinking it is the original, thereby lessening the value of
the original. See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). Thus a court must strike a balance between the likelihood of
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Therefore, a trademark is protected from uses that are likely to
confuse the public, and in turn supplant its product market, and
further, from non-confusing uses that nonetheless could diminish
its image. 10 4 Similar value to the owner of a copyright should be
recognized and subsequently protected.
IV. POLICIES ADVOCATING AN ECONOMIC Focus
An economic focus in the treatment of fair use parodies would
effectively serve to balance the numerous interests at stake. 1°5 It
would alleviate potential First Amendment issues1 06 by allowing
the public to benefit from the social and literary benefits of true
parodies. 0 7 Only those parodies that pose an economic threat to an
original author, and subsequently act as a disincentive for that au-
thor to create, would be deemed infringements.0 ' Moreover, an ec-
onomic focus would foster the creation of true parodies and protect
the rights of the parodist through the establishment of definitive
guidelines within which a parody would strictly be construed in
order to qualify as a fair use.109 The clarification of the fair use
confusion and the ability of a parodist to express her sentiment on a particular trademark
without commercially exploiting it. Id.
104 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151. Under federal and state law, the test of trademark
infringement is whether the unauthorized use is likely to confuse consumers as to its spon-
sorship or source, misleading them into believing it was approved by the trademark owner
and thus encouraging sales. Shaughnessy, supra note 101, at 1082-83. The dilution theory
statutes dispense with the "likelihood of confusion" requirement and include any sort of
unauthorized use that may dilute the trademark's value. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151.
105 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
106 See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit has noted that "[t]he fair use doctrine allows adjustments of
conflicts between the first amendment and the copyright laws." Id. at 206 (citing Wain-
wright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1014 (1978)).
101 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
'08 See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). "It is decidedly in the interests of creativity, not privacy, to permit authors to take
well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted works and add their own contributions
of commentary or humor." Id. (quoting Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720
F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)). However, infringers may not hide behind these creative inter-
ests protected under the First Amendment. See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[tlhe first amendment is not
a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property"); see also Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (mere claim of benefit to
public not "compulsory license" to impermissively use copyrighted material).
101 See Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 829. The parody branch of the fair use doctrine
has been recognized as a way to foster the creativity encouraged under the copyright laws.
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983). By
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standards would further prevent the courts from legislating in this
area,110 and thus lead to constancy in the application of the section
107 factors. Additionally, this clarification would eradicate the in-
terjection of moral judgment that has often occurred in adjudicat-
ing these matters.""
Further, such a focus would align the fair use doctrine with
the modern commercial marketplace, where "success breeds imita-
tion"'112 and derivative works often assume roles in the public do-
main far beyond those occupied or even contemplated by the origi-
nal." 3 In light of this, it should be the original author's right to
both control the production of these derivations and to reap their
concomitant rewards.1 4 Finally, a purely economic analysis of po-
tential fair use parodies would protect the interests of the owner of
a copyrighted television commercial or jingle." 5 Recognizing the
tremendous value of a dynamic advertising campaign to a copy-
adhering to a strict definition of parody, the courts will not be bombarded with commercial
works attempting to pass themselves off as parodies. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp.
at 830-31 (beer commercial using Joe Piscopo as one of the "Fat Boys"); DC Comics, Inc. v.
Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (electronics retailer using copy-
righted Superman television clips).
110 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 421
(1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting). Justice Douglas felt that the Court "reach[ed] the result it
achieve[d] today only by 'legislating' important features of the Copyright Act." Id.
" See Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 259 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (court noted history of fair use cases and harbored suspicion that success of fair use
defense depended upon whether parody in question "offend[ed] the mores" of the court);
see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
1'2 Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
"I See DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 116-17
(N.D. Ga. 1984); see also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp.
1517, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (consider derivative works which already or potentially exist).
Although the Superman and Wonder Woman characters began in comic books, they now
grace thousands of other products, "ranging from school bags to Halloween costumes to
wallpaper." DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 113. Even the Eveready bunny has enjoyed a rather
inconceivable expansion. In a recent political campaign, Michael Dewire ran an ad utilizing
a mechanical "bunny" with the same basic characteristics of the Energizer bunny, but with
the face of Senator John Glenn. The ad stated that the ex-astronaut just "keeps owing and
owing." See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Nation, New Heights in Political Low Blows, N.Y.
Tmns, Nov. 1, 1992, § 4, at 3.
214 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (right of original author to control derivative works); see also
New Line, 693 F. Supp. at 1528 (if defendant's work would directly compete with plaintiff's
derivation which has potential to become commercially valuable, not fair use).
"I See Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp 440, 445 (N.D. Il1.
1991); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 130 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Suc-
cessful commercials or jingles that are subsequently copyrighted are thereby associated with
the copyright owner, and should remain that way. Id.
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right owner in the modern marketplace, 116 the copyright law would
rightly abolish the utilization of the fair use defense by advertisers
who merely wish to "trad[e] upon the imagination and originality
of another" to promote their own commercial gain.11
CONCLUSION
Although the justification for an ad hoc approach to fair use
parody is understandable, application of this method seems to di-
rectly conflict with the delegation of constitutional powers in the
area of copyright legislation. "As the text of the Constitution
makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of de-
fining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors or to investors in order to give the public appropriate ac-
cess to their work product."1 " It is the legislature, not the courts,
that should continuously tailor the copyright laws to modern day
demands, as business relations between authors and users
evolve.119 The judiciary has repeatedly expressed reluctance to ex-
pand copyright protection without explicit legislative guidance, 120
yet it is evident by the expansive nature of the Eveready decision
that this is what in fact the court did.
Thus, in the absence of legislative clarification, the courts
must singularly establish practical guidelines for authors and paro-
"I See Dr. Pepper, 517 F. Supp. at 1203, 1208. The court recognized the extensive
skills advertisers exert when creating commercials. Id. at 1203. "Frivolity has become a seri-
ous business these days. Television commercials which are meant to portray a stylization of
the good life are crafted with great care ...... Id.; see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying
text.
et1 DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 119.
218 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The
reason the copyright statutes are amended so frequently by the legislature is to assure that
Congress defines this balance. See id.
119 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 47, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660; see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Pos-
ters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979) ("judgment of the constitution is that free
expression is enriched by protecting the creations of authors from exploitation by others,
and the Copyright Act is the congressional implementation of that judgment").
120 Sony 464 U.S. at 431. The Supreme Court, refusing to expand copyright protection,
has stated quite adamantly: "[w]e have been invited.., to render a compromise decision..
. [to] accommodate various competing considerations .... We decline the invitation. That
job is for Congress. We take the Copyright Act ... as we find it." Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968). Judge Fortas, dissenting in
Fortnightly, felt that the objective of the Court was to adjudicate in a manner which would
minimally alter traditional copyright principles, for it is the job of Congress to amend the
principles if they so desire. Id. at 404 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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dists to follow. By strictly adhering to a universally adopted defini-
tion of parody, which focuses on the work's critical or comical com-
ment and precludes its existence only if it economically hampers
the original author, courts will have a more cogent doctrine with
which to balance the interests of all concerned. The original author
will retain her economic incentive to create both primary works
and their derivatives, the parodist will be free to truly parody a
work, and the public will receive the benefits of both.
Rita A. Rodin
